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Abstract
Even if two testimonies in a criminal trial are independent, they are not
necessarily more trustworthy than one. But if they are independent in the
sense that they are screened off from one another by the crime, then two
testimonies raise the probability of guilt above the level that one testimony
alone could achieve. In fact this screening-off condition can be weakened
without changing the conclusion. It is however only a sufficient, not a neces-
sary condition for concluding that two witnesses are better than one. We will
discuss two different conditions, each of them necessary as well as sufficient,
and we conclude that one of them is slightly better than the other.
One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in
any sin that he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses . . . shall the matter be
established. Deuteronomy 19:15.
1 Introduction
Are two testimonies always better than one? If two witnesses that are gen-
erally known to be reliable give incriminating evidence, does this make the
probability that the defendant is guilty greater than it would be with only
one witness? Clearly the answer is in the negative. For one thing, the two
testimonies may contradict one another.
Is it enough that the testimonies are not contradictory? Again the answer
is no. Two independent testimonies, each of which by itself would increase
the probability of guilt, could together actually conspire to reduce this prob-
ability. The next section will contain an example of such a surprising case.
Perhaps screening off, as a special case of the Markov condition, will fit
the bill. Suppose that the testimonies are independent of one another, not
unconditionally, but conditional on the defendant’s being guilty, and also
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conditional on her being innocent. Is it now the case that the probability of
guilt is greater with two incriminating testimonies rather than just one? L.
Jonathan Cohen has shown that indeed it is.1 In fact, Cohen demonstrated
that even a weakened version of screening off is sufficient to obtain the result.
Conditional on guilt, the testimonies may be either independent or negatively
correlated, and conditional on innocence they may be either independent or
positively correlated. Assuming that each of the two testimonies is indeed
incriminating (i.e. each raises the probability that the defendant is guilty),
weakened screening off guarantees that two testimonies are better than one.
Weakened screening off is however by no means necessary to draw this
conclusion. This was first shown by L.J. O’Neill, who formulated a condition
that is both necessary and sufficient.2 The same condition was later given
by George Schlesinger, who proves it in a different manner.3 Both proofs in
a sense rely on Cohen’s demonstration. We will establish a slightly different
necessary and sufficient condition, one that does not depend on Cohen’s ar-
gument and which has some practical advantage over the O’Neill-Schlesinger
condition.
We shall proceed as follows. In Section 2 we consider a murder trial and
show that in general two independent testimonies may reduce the probability
below what it was in the presence of only one testimony. In Section 3 we
demonstrate that this is no longer the case if a Markov condition is in place:
under that condition, two testimonies make it more probable that the crime
has been committed. Section 4 is devoted to a relaxation of the Markov con-
dition; and we explain how Cohen’s argument can be considerably simplified.
In Section 5 we outline the necessary and sufficient condition as formulated
by O’Neill and Schlesinger, followed by an alternative condition that is like-
wise necessary and sufficient. In Section 6 we explain why the alternative is
to be preferred in some cases.
2 Murder Most Foul
Alice and Bob live in a large house and have been married for many years.
But one day Bob is found dead in the couple’s bedroom. He had been shot
1Cohen 1976, Cohen 1977, 104-107.
2O’Neill 1982.
3Schlesinger 1991, 155-157. Schlesinger fails to mention O’Neill, although he must have
been familiar with his result, having seen Cohen’s reply to O’Neill (Cohen 1982).
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in the head. Alice is a prime suspect as the perpetrator of the crime; she is
arraigned and the prosecutor claims that
C : Alice killed her husband.
There are two witnesses for the prosecution, Clara and Deanna. Clara
testifies
T1 : Alice had a gun in her purse on the night of the crime.
Deanna claims that
T2 : Alice had an argument with Bob on the night of the crime.
Clearly, each testimony increases the probability that Alice committed the
crime:
P (C|T1) > P (C) and P (C|T2) > P (C) . (1)
It might appear that both testimonies together should make it more probable
that Alice killed her husband than would just one of the testimonies by itself.
That is, if (1), it seems as though the following inequalities should hold:
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T1) and P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T2) . (2)
But of course this conclusion is not necessarily true. For suppose that Clara
had asked Deanna to trump up some claim if she, Clara, should be asked
to produce her testimony. Then it would seem clear that adding Deanna’s
testimony will not increase the probability of Alice’s guilt above what it
would have been if only Clara had testified.
One might guess that, if there is on the contrary no collusion or other
relevant contact between Clara and Deanna, so that testimonies T1 and T2 are
independent of one another, then the inequalities (2) should hold. However,
independence of the testimonies, that is
P (T1|T2) = P (T1) , (3)
is in fact not a sufficient condition for the validity of (2). Here is a counterex-
ample. Look at the probability distribution in the Venn diagram of Figure
1. The triple probabilities can be read off from the diagram; for example
P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ C) = 164 and P (¬T1 ∧ ¬T2 ∧ ¬C) = 3364 .
With this probability distribution we check that (1) and (3) are satisfied,
but
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) = 14 < 716 = P (C|T1) = P (C|T2) .
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So in this example the two testimonies together would actually decrease the
probability of Alice’s guilt from the value that one testimony alone would
produce, and this despite the fact that the testimonies are independent.
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Figure 1: Triple probabilities for independent testimonies
In Section 6 we return to Alice and the hapless Bob; but first we shall
look at some further examples in order to explain the condition of screening
off.
3 The Markov Condition
The Markov condition has proven to be of use in various contexts: Hans
Reichenbach introduces it as the screening-off requirement in his discussion
of the common cause; and nowadays it is much applied in DAGs and in algo-
rithms for search engines.4 In the present discussion, the condition requires
that the two testimonies by Clara and Deanna are screened off from one an-
other in the sense that they are independent conditional on the defendant’s
being guilty, and also independent conditional on her being innocent. The
difference between this condition and that of the previous section is that, in-
4Reichenbach 1956, 159; Pearl 2000.
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stead of one restriction of unconditional independence, there are rather two
conditional independence conditions.
Under screening off it does follow that two testimonies make the conclu-
sion more probable than just one. Thus Erik Olsson writes:
[I]n the context of Conditional Independence, Weak Foundationalism
does imply Coherence Justification. Indeed, the combined testimonies
will, in this case, confer more support upon the conclusion than the
testimonies did individually.5
‘Conditional Independence’ for Olsson is precisely the Markov condition; and
‘Weak Foundationalism’ implies in our example that C is made more proba-
ble by one testimony than it was in the absence of a testimony. ‘Coherence
Justification’ means that the combined testimonies also render C more proba-
ble than it was in the absence of a testimony. The second sentence of Olsson
is the stronger claim that the Markov condition is sufficient to guarantee
that the combined testimonies make it more probable that the crime was
commited than does just one testimony.
Here is an example of a situation in which screening off holds sway; it ap-
plies to the reviewing of a scientific paper rather than a courtroom situation.
Consider the following propositions:
C : The paper is of high quality.
T1 : The expert reviewer #1 recommended publication.
T2 : The expert reviewer #2 recommended publication.
If we do not know whether any of these statements are true, we will conclude
that the paper is more likely of high quality if reviewer 1, or reviewer 2, rec-
ommended publication, then if no reviews were made, i.e. P (C|T1) > P (C)
and P (C|T2) > P (C). Moreover, the probability that reviewer 1 recom-
mended publication, given that the paper is of high quality, is the same as
the probability that reviewer 1 recommended publication, given that the pa-
per is of high quality and that reviewer 2 recommended publication, for the
two reviewers are independent. That is, once we know that the paper is of
high quality, it is very probable that reviewer 1 had recommended publica-
tion, and the recommendation of reviewer 2 does not affect this probability,
so P (T1|C ∧ T2) = P (T1|C).
5Olsson 2017, 20.
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This is not the full description of screening off, however. To achieve that
we must add the corresponding equation in which C is replaced by its nega-
tion: P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) = P (T1|¬C). This condition means that the (low)
probability that reviewer 1 recommended publication, given that the paper
is not of high quality, is the same as the probability that reviewer 1 recom-
mended publication, given that the paper is not of high quality, and that
reviewer 2 recommended publication. In this case also, the recommendation
of reviewer 2 does not affect the probability that reviewer 1 recommended
publication.
L. Jonathan Cohen appears to be the first to have seen that the Markov
condition is sufficient to guarantee that the combined testimonies make the
defendant’s guilt more probable than one would have done. In other words,
he saw that two witnesses are better than one, i.e.
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|Ti) i = 1, 2 . (4)
if the following three conditions are satisfied
P (C|Ti) > P (C) i = 1, 2 ,
P (T1|C ∧ T2) = P (T1|C)
P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) = P (T1|¬C).
Here the second and the third condition together constitute the Markov con-
straint. The first condition expresses the fact that the testimonies are indeed
incriminating. In his book Cohen has expressed reservations about this con-
dition, since it allegedly implies that some positive prior probability P (C)
is assignable, which appears to be at odds with the practice in many legal
systems.6 Although Cohen is of course right in stressing the tension between
actual judicial custom and formal probability theory, his complaint about the
roˆle of P (C) is perhaps overemphasized. Firstly, there is no need to attach
a precise value to P (C); it is enough to assume that it is not zero, since we
are interested in an increase of probability, and only if P (C) is positive can
this take place. The numerical size of the increment is here of no concern: it
is simply a premise that P (C|Ti) is greater than P (C). Secondly, assuming
that P (C) is not zero is in fact quite harmless. It reflects the logical possi-
bility that a person is guilty, or in other words, that her being innocent is
not a tautology. It seems to us that such an assumption has to be made, on
6Cohen 1977, 65, 107-108.
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pain of falling prey to some sort of tunnel vision. Thirdly, P (C|Ti) > P (C)
is true if and only P (Ti|C) > P (Ti|¬C) is true7, so we may always use the
latter rather than the former if we want to avoid the offending P (C).8
4 Relaxation of the Markov Condition
In the previous section we have seen that Cohen formally derived (4) from
three conditions, but in fact he did more: he proved that (4) follows from
conditions that are considerably weaker that these three, as we will now
explain.
Suppose again that each of the two testimonies increases the probability
that the defendant is guilty: P (C|Ti) > P (C) with i = 1, 2. Now weaken the
Markov condition to:
P (T1|C ∧ T2) ≥ P (T1|C)
P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) ≤ P (T1|¬C) . (5)
Note that the two inequalities go in opposite directions, and also that the
original Markov condition corresponds to the special case of (5) in which the
inequality signs are replaced by equalities.
7On condition of course that all these conditional probabilities are defined, i.e. 0 <
P (C) < 1 and P (Ti) > 0.
8The question ‘When are two witnesses better than one?’ is sometimes raised in a
different sense than the one that we are considering and that Cohen had in mind. For
example, Elliott Sober writes (Sober 2008, 42 — we have adjusted the symbols to agree
with our notation):
When are two witnesses better than one? If the witnesses agree that C is
true, and the two witnesses go about their business independently, the two
pieces of testimony discriminate more powerfully between C and ¬C than
either does by itself, in the sense that
P (T1 ∧ T2|C)
P (T1 ∧ T2|¬C) >
P (Ti|C)
P (Ti|¬C) > 1 i = 1, 2
Sober is thus interested in another inequality than Cohen’s, namely the inequality in which
C and ¬C are to the right, rather than to the left of the bar in P ( | ). This inequality is
easier to prove, since one does not have to go through Cohen’s manipulations to move C
to the left of the bar (see the next section and our appendix for the details of Cohen’s
insight). Sober assumes the Markov condition, but does not notice that his inequality is
also valid when this condition is relaxed.
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According to Cohen, from (5) it follows that two witnesses are better than
one, so we do not need the original strict Markov condition to derive (4). He
gives the following example to bolster this intuition. Interpret testimonies
T1 and T2 as follows:
T1 : The defendant had a motive for killing the victim.
T2 : The defendant lacked grief at the victim’s death.
and let C be
C : The defendant killed the victim.
The probability that the defendant had a motive, given that he killed the
victim and also felt no grief, is greater than the probability that he had a
motive, given only that he killed the victim. This is precisely what is implied
by the first line of (5). As Cohen phrases it:
. . . if he was the killer, his lack of grief would confirm the strength
of his motive and his motive would confirm that his apparent lack
of grief was not due to concealment of his feelings.9
The interpretation is also consistent with the second line of (5). The proba-
bility that the man had a motive, given that he was innocent and lacked grief
is clearly equal to the probability that he had a motive, given that he was
innocent. After all, if he is innocent, his lack of grief seems to be irrelevant.
Maybe the man is in general not very capable of feeling empathy; or maybe
he is empathetic, but does not experience grief because he is overwhelmed
and absorbed by other feelings, such as fear for the police and anxiety about
the Kafkaesque situation that he finds himself in.
The interpretation thus satisfies (5), and it therefore guarantees (4): given
that the man has a motive and lacks grief, the probability that he is guilty
of the killing is greater than if he only had a motive or only lacks grief,
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|Ti) where i = 1, 2. In the words of Cohen:
. . . a man’s having a motive for killing the victim and his lack of
grief at the victim’s death could converge to raise the probability
of his being the killer, even though either fact would increase the
probability of the other.10
9Cohen 1976, 74.
10Cohen 1976, 74.
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In the above example of Cohen, (5) is satisfied because the first line has a
‘greater than’ (>) whereas the second line uses an equality sign (=). Here is
an example in which it is the other way around.11
C : Kevin is employed by a criminal syndicate as a lover boy.
T1 : Kevin showers Mary with loving attention and buys her presents, many
of them obtainable only on the black market.
T2 : Kevin often leaves Mary alone with unsavoury men, who take sexual
advantage of her.
The probability that Kevin is employed as a lover boy is increased by either
of his actions T1 or T2: i.e. P (C|T1) > P (C) and P (C|T2) > P (C); but in the
absence of the information about Kevin’s employment, it seems clear that T1
and T2 are in tension with each other. They are not mutually incompatible;
but there is certainly a negative correlation between them, which is expressed
by P (T1|T2) < P (T1). However, P (T1|C ∧ T2) = P (T1|C), since adding
the information about the unsavoury men to the knowledge that Kevin is a
lover boy does not alter the probability that T1 is true. On the other hand,
conditioning on information that Kevin is not employed as a lover boy would
not remove the tension between T1 and T2, so we would expect P (T1|¬C ∧
T2) < P (T1|¬C). So this example satisfies (5) because it corresponds to the
situation in which the sign in the first line is = and in the second one is <.
Both examples above imply a violation of the original Markov constraint.12
They help us in developing the intuition that (4) follows from (5), but of
course they do not constitute a proof. In his paper Cohen has successfully
demonstrated that the above weakening of the Markov condition suffices to
ensure that two witnesses are better than one. That is, he proved that (4) can
be derived from (5), together with the assumption that the testimonies are
incriminating, P (C|Ti) > P (C) with i = 1, 2. Although very ingenious, Co-
hen’s proof is long, taking up more than three pages, and also a bit intricate.
In our appendix we offer a shortened and more transparent proof.13
11This example is not one of Cohen’s.
12The second example illustrates that especially the second leg of the Markov condition
— independence conditional on the negation of C — is questionable, and may be downright
inappropriate (Author’s publication 2013).
13After having completed this paper, we discovered the paper of Carl G. Wagner, in
which the author likewise complains that Cohen’s proof “runs to three pages” (Wagner
2013, 1460). Wagner gives a shorter proof that in part is similar to ours.
9
5 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
As was first noted by O’Neill, Cohen’s condition (5) is only a sufficient con-
dition, not a necessary one, that two testimonies are better than one.14 He
points out that
P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) (6)
is a necessary and sufficient condition that
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T2) . (7)
In order to obtain also P (C|T1∧T2) > P (C|T1), we would need P (T2|C∧T1) >
P (T2|¬C ∧ T1) too. If we spell this out in full we find that
P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|¬C ∧ T2)
P (T2|C ∧ T1) > P (T2|¬C ∧ T1) (8)
is necessary and sufficient for inequality (4), the statement that two witnesses
are better than one:
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|Ti) i = 1, 2 .
In reply to O’Neill, Cohen grants that formally (8) is necessary and suf-
ficient for (4), but he stresses that in forensic contexts (5) will still be indis-
pensable.15 Carl Wagner however gives an argument based on second-order
probabilities to the effect that Cohen’s (5) should not be regarded as a nec-
essary condition.16 Moreover, George N. Schlesinger has presented examples
in which one or other of Cohen’s inequalities (5) would be violated, but in
which (8) is respected. One such example (in our notation) is the following.17
Suppose that C is the contention that a patient is strongly addicted to
alcohol, let T2 be the claim that he has gulped down a jigger of denatured
alcohol, and T1 that he has immediately afterwards gulped down another
jigger containing a similar substance. Given the aversion that the denaturing
of alcohol engenders, we would expect P (T1|C ∧ T2) < P (T1|C), that is, the
probability that the alcoholic patient drinks another jigger (T1), given that
he has already drunk one (T2), and therefore has a feeling of nausea, is less
14O’Neill 1982.
15Cohen 1982.
16Wagner 2013.
17Schlesinger 1991, 151.
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than the probability that he drinks the second jigger (T1), given only that
he is strongly addicted to alcohol (C). This inequality contradicts Cohen’s
condition (5) in that it is inconsistent with its first line. Nevertheless it is still
true that it is more likely that the patient is strongly addicted to alcohol if he
drinks both jiggers than if he only drinks one, i.e. P (C|T1∧T2) > P (C|T2).18
We do not want to go into all the details of Cohen’s proof. For our
purposes it is enough to say that he goes from (5) to (4) via a formula that
is equivalent to our (8).19 Cohen first proves that (5) is sufficient for (8) and
then that the latter suffices for (4). In schema:
(5) −→ (8) −→ (4) .
O’Neill and Schlesinger however note that (8) and (4) are equivalent:
(5) −→ (8)←→ (4) .
Since (5) can be false while (8) is true (an example is given by the above
story about the denatured alcohol), one might start the derivation with (8)
rather than (5), and this is precisely what both O’Neill and Schlesinger do.
In this sense their proofs rely on that of Cohen: they pick out, as it were,
the (8)-(4) part only of Cohen’s (5)-(8)-(4) reasoning.
A new and useful alternative to condition (8) is afforded by the insight
that (8) is true if and only if the following inequality holds:
P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|T2) . (9)
Since (9) is also a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of (4),
we have a new schema, which does not use Cohen’s (8):
(5) −→ (9)←→ (4) .
The technical justification of all these claims can be found in the appendix.
As we will argue in the next section, in practice our (9) is sometimes prefer-
able to (8).
18Ibid. We have replaced Schlesinger’s D by C, his E1 is our T2, and his E2 is our T1; we
switched the indices 1 and 2 in order to discuss the example more easily. Three decades
after O’Neill and Schlesinger proved that (8) is a necessary and sufficient condition for
(4), Michael Huemer derived the same result, apparently unaware of their achievements
(Huemer 2007). The fact that he has not seen Schlesinger’s attempt to give examples might
explain why Huemer is unduly pessimistic about the practical utility of the derivation.
19The formula in question is inequality (40) on p. 77 of Cohen 1976, and inequality (39)
on p. 106 of Cohen 1977.
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The probability distribution depicted in Figure 2 illustrates a situation
where Cohen’s condition (5) fails, but (8) as well as our (9) applies. The
following inequalities hold:
P (T1|C ∧ T2) = 45 < 56 = P (T1|C)
P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) = 35 > 12 = P (T1|¬C)
P (T1|C ∧ T2) = 45 > 35 = P (T1|¬C ∧ T2)
P (T1|C ∧ T2) = 45 > 710 = P (T1|T2)
P (C|T2) = 12 > 38 = P (C)
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) = 47 > 12 = P (C|T2) .
From the first two inequalities we see that both conditions of the weakened
Markov condition (5) are violated; while the third and fourth show that the
O’Neill-Schlesinger condition (8) and our new condition (9) are satisfied. The
fifth inequality shows that the second testimony raises the probability of C
above what it originally was; and the sixth indicates that the two testimonies
increase the probability even more.
C
T1
T2
1
4 0
3
16
3
16
1
8
1
16
1
8
1
16
Figure 2: Violation of Cohen’s Condition
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have seen that under the Markov condition two witnesses are better than
one; and we recalled L. Jonathan Cohen’s proof that even a weakened version
the Markov requirement is enough to draw that conclusion. Cohen’s proof
is however long and somewhat impenetrable, and we have replaced it by a
simpler and more transparant one.
Like the proof of Cohen, ours gives only a sufficient and not a necessary
condition for the conclusion that two witnesses are to be preferred. L.J.
O’Neill succeeded in finding a condition that is both necessary and sufficient,
and Schlesinger illustrated it by giving some real life examples. We showed
that their reasoning is actually dependent on Cohen’s, in the sense that it
uses the second half of Cohen’s argument; and we have offered a necessary
and sufficient condition which is different from Cohen’s reasoning.
Here is how Alice’s trial of Section 2 is analyzed when our condition is
used. Recall the testimonies by Clara and Deanna respectively:
T1 : Alice had a gun in her purse on the night of the crime.
T2 : Alice had an argument with Bob on the night of the crime.
P (T1|T2) is the probability that Clara’s testimony was trustworthy, on con-
dition that there was indeed a connubial altercation. In the first instance we
supposed that the testimonies of Clara and Deanna were independent of one
another: P (T1|T2) = P (T1). In many contexts this seems a natural assump-
tion to make. After all, Alice may simply have been exercising her second
amendment rights, and then having a gun in her purse had nothing to do
with her quarrel with Bob. Independence of the two testimonies is however
neither necessary nor sufficient for the conclusion that two testimonies are
better than one would have been.
Often P (T1|T2) is not equal to P (T1). Alice may have taken the gun out
of its box with the explicit purpose of effecting the quietus of her quarrelsome
spouse; and if we add the hypothesis that Alice actually did shoot Bob to the
condition that Deanna told the truth, the probability that Clara’s testimony
was accurate will surely be increased:
P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|T2) .
As we have seen, this inequality is a necessary and sufficient condition that
the two testimonies are superior to one.
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We believe there are scenarios where our necessary and sufficient condition
fares better than that of O’Neill or Schlesinger. For example, imagine a
special sale of 100 television sets is announced in a downtown store, but due
to a miscommunication between the employees, nobody checked whether the
customers actually paid for what they took home. Consider the following
propositions:
C : 99 of the 100 television sets carried out of this store have been stolen.
T1 : Jones has not paid for a television set.
T2 : Jones carried a television set out of this store.
The conditional probability that Jones has not paid anything, given that 99 of
the 100 television sets were stolen, and that he was seen leaving the store with
a television set, namely P (T1|C ∧ T2), is at least 0.99.20 On the other hand,
the conditional probability that Jones has not paid anything, given merely
that he was seen leaving the store with a television set, P (T1|T2) (without the
information that 99 sets have been stolen), is certainly considerably less than
0.99. Thus P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|T2), which is our necessary and sufficient
condition for P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T2) to hold. For the O’Neill-Schlesinger
inequality we would need to look at P (T1|¬C∧T2), the conditional probability
that he has not paid anything, given that it is not the case that 99 of the
100 sets were stolen, and that he was seen leaving the store with a television
set. This is clearly an awkward condition: does it allow perhaps that 98
sets were stolen, or maybe even all 100? Our condition, in which we do not
need to consider what ¬C implies, is more straightforward in this case. It
is of course true that if our inequality is satisfied, so is the one of O’Neill
and Schlesinger, and vice versa: it is simply a matter of which is the more
convenient.
20P (T1|C ∧ T2) = P (T1∧T2|C)P (T2|C) = 0.99P (T2|C) ≥ 0.99.
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Appendix
Theorem
If the following conditions are satisfied
P (C|Ti) > P (C) i = 1, 2 , (10)
P (T1|C ∧ T2) ≥ P (T1|C) (11)
P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) ≤ P (T1|¬C) , (12)
then
P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|Ti) i = 1, 2 . (13)
The probabilities are assumed to be regular, i.e. the values 0 and 1 are
excluded.
Proof
P (T1|C)− P (T1|¬C) = P (T1 ∧ C)− P (T1)P (C)
P (C)P (¬C)
=
[P (C|T1)− P (C)]P (T1)
P (C)P (¬C) .
From (10) we see that P (C|T1) − P (C) is positive, and it therefore follows
from the above equation that P (T1|C)−P (T1|¬C) is positive. In other words,
P (T1|C) > P (T1|¬C) ;
and from (11) and (12) we conclude that
P (T1|C ∧ T2) ≥ P (T1|C) > P (T1|¬C) ≥ P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) , (14)
so that
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)
P (C ∧ T2) >
P (T1 ∧ ¬C ∧ T2)
P (¬C ∧ T2) . (15)
After cross-multiplication and use of total probability, we find
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)[P (T2)− P (C ∧ T2)]
> P (C ∧ T2)[P (T1 ∧ T2)− P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)] . (16)
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Multiplying the parentheses out, we see that two terms cancel, leaving
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)P (T2) > P (C ∧ T2)P (T1 ∧ T2) . (17)
In view of the regularity condition, we may divide both sides freely by prob-
abilities, obtaining two useful expressions:
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)
P (C ∧ T2) >
P (T1 ∧ T2)
P (T2)
, (18)
and also
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)
P (T1 ∧ T2) >
P (C ∧ T2)
P (T2)
.
The latter inequality implies that P (C|T1∧T2) > P (C|T2), which is one half
of what we wanted to demonstrate. We prove P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T1) by
interchanging T1 and T2 in the whole demonstration.
Corollary
A particular case of conditions (11) and (12) is obtained by requiring inde-
pendence of the two testimonies, conditional on C and on ¬C, which is the
classic Markov constraint:
P (T1|C ∧ T2) = P (T1|C) and P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) = P (T1|¬C).
The conclusion (13) is the same.
Comment
From (14) we have
P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|¬C ∧ T2) , (19)
this being the Schlesinger constraint; and the conditions (11) and (12) can
be replaced by (19). From (18) we see that
P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|T2) . (20)
This inequality holds if and only if (19) does, and it constitutes a necessary
and sufficient condition for P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T2) to hold. This is clear,
since if (20) does not hold, i.e. if
P (T1|C ∧ T2) ≤ P (T1|T2) ,
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then
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)
P (C ∧ T2) ≤
P (T1 ∧ T2)
P (T2)
,
so
P (T1 ∧ C ∧ T2)
P (T1 ∧ T2) ≤
P (C ∧ T2)
P (T2)
,
which means that P (C|T1 ∧ T2) ≤ P (C|T2). In other words, if (20) does not
hold, then it is not true that P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T2).
We conclude that P (T1|C ∧ T2) > P (T1|T2) is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the validity of P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T2). By interchanging
T1 and T2, we see also that P (T2|C ∧ T1) ≤ P (T2|T1) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the validity of P (C|T1 ∧ T2) > P (C|T1).
References
Author’s publication. 2013.
Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1976. How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another?
in Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, eds. R.S. Cohen, P.K. Feyerabend,
and M.W. Wartofsky, 65-78. Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel Publishing
Company.
Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1977. The Probable and the Provable. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1982. Corroborating Testimonies. British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 33: 161-164.
Huemer, Michael. 2007. Weak Bayesian Coherentism. Synthese 157: 337-346.
Olsson, Erik. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2017 Edition. Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/justep-coherence/>.
O’Neill, L.J. 1982. Corroborating Testimonies. British Journal for the Phi-
losophy of Science 33: 60-63.
Pearl, Judea. 2000. Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reichenbach, Hans. 1956. The Direction of Time. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Schlesinger, George N. 1991. The Sweep of Probability. Notre Dame: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press.
Sober, Elliott. 2008. Evidence and Evolution. The Logic Behind the Science.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wagner, Carl G. 2013. The Corroboration Paradox. Synthese 190: 1455-1469.
17
